GLOBAL CONCEPTUAL HISTORY
A Reader

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History of Concepts and Global History
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Dietrich Busse is a German linguist and political scientist. He received his PhD in linguistics in 1984 after studying philosophy, linguistics, German, sociology and political science. Busse has held a professorship in German linguistics at the University of Düsseldorf, Germany since 2001. His main fields of research include historical semantics, language theory, textual linguistics, speech comprehension, linguistic use, discourse analysis and epistemology as well as legal linguistics.


In the text presented here, Dietrich Busse analyses the relationship between conceptual history and the history of discourse. Originally published soon after the completion of Reinhart Koselleck’s Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, it reflects upon developments in conceptual history and linguistics in post-war Germany. He criticizes the balance between language and social history that had been so important to Koselleck and argues for its reconceptualization in light of the linguistic turn, thus emphasizing the constructive character of language.
(1) Introductory Remarks

'Conceptual history or a history of discourse' – this formulation expresses an opposition that is often evoked but is essentially not entirely justifiable, and one which is ultimately only apparent. If, after twenty years of discussing the necessity, basis and methodological problems of discourse-historical research, such clarification is still required, may I draw attention to the more specific subtitle of this article. I would like to address in the following the theoretical basis and certain methodological issues around what I would describe today (perhaps more clearly than before) as a historical-semantic epistemology. The intentions of the concept of historical semantics I propose would be misconstrued if the 'or' in the title of my paper were to be understood as an exclusive 'or'. But it is not actually a matter of opposition. Rather (as I have repeatedly emphasized in the past also, although this has not always been heeded), it suggests a development and broadening of the methodological spectrum – not of the objectives! – of historical semantics.

I would like to develop my reflections on the basis and methodological problems of a historical-semantic epistemology in four steps. Following a brief explanation of the motives and objectives I associate with historical semantics, I would like to discuss, in the second step, the opportunities and limitations of conceptual history as a starting point for all subsequent approaches to historical semantics. In the third step I shall explain in detail the objectives and methods of an epistemologically oriented discourse analysis. Finally, I would like to consider how basic discourse-semantic paradigms function. I will illustrate this with the paradigm of 'the self and the other'.

(2) Motives and Objectives of Historical Semantics

The 'archaeology' (freely adapted from Foucault) of my own exploration of key questions of historical semantics revealed something that was surprising even to me when I discovered it – the first draft of my project later published under the title 'Historical Semantics' had borne the title 'Systems of Meaning'. This heading clearly sought to describe a semantics that was to be liberated from the constraints of the kind of narrowly defined lexical semantics that dominated the linguistic mainstream in the seventies. It was to be a 'rich' semantics that would overcome the methodological barriers of an isolated study of the meanings of individual words and of a reductionist componental semantics. It therefore had to be programmatically and theoretically formulated, and prevail, against the major linguistic-semantic trends. (A certain argumentative acerbity towards conceptual history in my earlier studies on historical semantics may occasionally have been the cause of some confusion. It doubtless stemmed from my concern that conceptual history might, despite its epistemological interests, revert to the constraints of an isolated concept of the meaning of words and thus obstruct important opportunities for the acquisition of epistemological knowledge.) Although this polarity still applies to large areas of linguistic semantic research, the current state of the debate on semantic theory also suggests surprising points of contact between the goal I had over twenty years ago of analysing 'systems of meaning' and today's linguistic avant-garde. It appears that a direct link can be made to the analysis of 'semantic networks' and 'frames of knowledge' in contemporary cognitive semantics. The latter likewise (with different motives) advocates the concept of a 'rich' semantics that goes beyond componental analysis and the lexical semantic constraints of traditional linguistics.

The analysis of 'semantic networks' and 'frames of knowledge' in contemporary cognitive semantics seeks to reconstruct the synchronic cognitive landscape of individuals or speech communities in order to implement or reproduce natural language processes on computing machines. By contrast, my reflections regarding the analysis of 'systems of meaning', with which my exploration of questions around historical semantics began, was from the outset diachronic in orientation, that is, socio-historically and historico-culturally motivated. In short, they were and are oriented towards an historical epistemology, a history of knowledge and consciousness that lays bare the representation of the social knowledge of an era in its genesis, its constituting conditions, its historico-cultural traditions and its epistemic undercurrents.

Theoretical connections appeared helpful in realizing this objective. They made it possible to interpret social semantics as the constitution of reality through language and to see in the epistemic conditions and networks the foundations of a contingent social consciousness of reality. An historical epistemology founded on (linguistic) semantics was to be framed by four areas of theoretical reflection. The first pertained to the general theoretical basis of an (historical) epistemology, whose frame of reference was provided...
by the uneasy triumvirate of Humboldt–Wittgenstein–Foucault. Wilhelm von Humboldt’s theory of language seemed to me highly relevant with regard to the close interrelationship between linguistic and philosophical (epistemological and other) questions, and in particular with regard to the close connection between language and the constitution of reality. In my view, this made Humboldt one of the founding fathers of a semantically grounded epistemology. ("The word, which first makes an individual the concept in the world of thought, will always add something more of its own significance, and while the idea gains shape through this, it is also at the same time preserved within certain bounds.")) Wittgenstein II provided the tools of philosophical theory that made it possible to explain the interplay of the constitution, transmission and changes of meaning with his concept of meaning, his language-game and rule model, and his concept of life-form. Finally, Foucault’s discourse analysis created the link between the underlying theoretical philosophical questions and the specific historical and empirical localization of an historical epistemology, and called attention (as did the other two authors, albeit much more obliquely) to aspects of epistemic-semantic predispositions pertaining to the analytics of power.

The second area I touched upon at that time concerned the sociological foundations of an historical epistemology, the influence of the public sphere on the development of social semantics, and the public sphere as a space of signification and of the emergence and development of social knowledge. The third theoretical area concerns the theory of language underlying historical semantics in the narrower sense. (By ‘historical semantics’ I meant and mean both the empirical description and the theoretical underpinnings of the explanation of semantic change.) This linguistic foundation of historical semantics was built on a concept of language deriving from action theory. Its key aim was to clarify the following central problems of the theory of language:

1. The explanation of the conditions and functioning of the constitution of signification (i.e. meaning conveyed through language).
2. The explanation of the conditions and functioning of the transmission or handing down of signification (i.e. meaning conveyed through language).
3. The explanation of the conditions and functioning of changes (shifts) in signification (i.e. meaning conveyed through language), also and especially in the sense of changing systems of meaning.

Incidentally, the above-mentioned first draft of an analysis of systems of meaning did not include any reference to the objectives, programme or methodology of a conceptual history (for instance in the Koselleckian sense). However, (having been suggested), it proved extraordinarily fruitful. In Koselleck’s programme of ‘Fundamental Concepts in History’, I discovered an aspiration to a semantically grounded historical epistemology which bore a close affinity to my own reflections. The orientation expressed therein towards ‘concepts’ as theoretical and methodological touchstones of semantic analysis did, admittedly, pose a certain problem from my point of view. However, I wish to touch upon these problems only briefly at this point.

(3) Conceptual History as a Starting Point for Historical-semantic Epistemology: Opportunities and Limitations

Even if it follows a programme as ambitious as the one developed for the ‘Fundamental Concepts in History’, conceptual history is only one of a number of ways in which historical semantics can be, and has been, conducted. Other common methods include

1. Traditional lexical history (rooted in etymology).
2. The standard historical lexical semantics, as conducted for instance in the context of historical lexicography.
3. The history of ideas, in philosophy and historiography, including the traditional epistemology from which Foucault so vehemently distanced his programme of discourse analysis. The history of ideas can be interpreted as an historical semantics avant la lettre in some of its aims and methods, if not in what it claims to represent.
4. Semantic tools can also be found in all histories of consciousness, for example as the history of everyday consciousness and of mentalities or as the history of cultural memory. These research approaches are often concerned precisely with the historically specific conditions of the constitution of social reality and awareness of reality.
Historical semantics then also includes political speech analysis and language criticism, which are concerned with uncovering the ideological tools of public language usage.

6 And, finally, there is the integrative approach of a history of discourse, involving, among other things, the analysis of discursive mechanisms and their thematic, textual and semantic expression – as a contribution to a semantically grounded historical epistemology in the post-Foucauldian sense.

Frequently, too little attention is paid to the specifics of what each of these disciplines hopes to achieve and the consequent need for theoretical groundwork and methodology and the practice of historical-semantic empiricism. These are all legitimate objectives in and of themselves, which may have a common underlying theory of language but certainly cannot share a single methodology and empirical practice. This means that there is not and cannot be, a single historical semantics. Rather, there is at best a spectrum of partially overlapping, partially mutually exclusive aspects and perspectives.

Any semantic analysis that begins with a single sign or word and thinks it possible to have an isolated lexical semantics, is from an epistemological or depth semantic point of view, a kind of tip-of-the-iceberg semantics. This is because it leaves unexplained, ignores, or at best assumes to be obvious everyday knowledge – thus dismissing as uninteresting (for further study or semantic explication) – 80–90 per cent of the knowledge required to completely actualize the meaning of a word in the given context. When historical semantics are methodically justified as conceptual history, a linguistically motivated conception of depth semantics initially runs into problems for the chief reason that, in the context of the theoretical tradition of linguistics, the term ‘concept’ is intimately connected with an isolating, reductionist lexical semantics. This is not only true of the Fregean or Carnapian logical semantics, which are still influential today and clearly informed by the theory of concepts. It is also true of the only analysis concept to have emerged to date out of linguistics itself, namely the structurally motivated feature semantics (or componental semantics). With its atomistic concept of features, which it shares with logical semantics, it draws on ideas at the root of the theory of concepts (with highly problematic ontological implications). This semantics based on the theory of concepts is sometimes dubbed the ‘NSC concept’ (i.e. ‘concept of necessary and sufficient conditions’) in the current discussion on semantic theory. Viewed from the perspective of an epistemologically motivated ‘rich’ semantics, it is tantamount to a reductionism of enormous proportions. Among other things, it ignores the very aspects that are of greatest interest with regard to the history of knowledge in the semantics of (elementary or more complex) verbal expressions.

There has, of course, never been any suggestion that the concept of conceptual history advocated by Reinhart Koselleck and others had anything to do with this reductionism based on the theory of concepts that is found in the linguistic-semantic mainstream. The epistemological perspective of their historiographical approach is enough to preclude this. But perhaps it explains a certain reluctance towards any positive adoption of the concept-concept and its application in the context of the historical-semantic analysis of ‘systems of meaning’ that I have in mind. Incidentally, and purely for the sake of completeness, I may mention that the concept-concept (concept semantics) is experiencing a renaissance in the context of cognitive semantics. In this incarnation, which deals with the analysis of semantic networks and systems of frames of knowledge, it is much more compatible with the objectives of an epistemologically motivated, ‘rich’ semantics than the reductionist semantic models of the intermediate linguistic-semantic phase in the 60s, 70s and 80s.\[12\]

I also believe I have a better understanding (than I did twenty years ago) of the motives behind Koselleck’s formulation of his concept of conceptual history; and my impression, with all due respect, is that these motives have only partially been realized in the majority of the articles as they stand in the ‘Fundamental Concepts in History’. Koselleck was and is concerned, I believe, with nothing more nor less than a cabinet of curiosities, a typology of concepts as movens, as agents of the historical process. His version of conceptual history is historical and historiographical in the complete, best sense because it seeks to analyse concepts as individuals, as it were, as driving forces in the historical process. Accordingly, concepts for Koselleck are epistemic entities that are not tied to individual words and their meanings, despite the fact that they can be named and identified with key words and often obtain their function as drivers of history precisely through this blatant, propagandistic identifiability.

In contrast to such a narrative – if I may call it this – of an animate, animated, and dynamic world of concepts, the sober perspective of an analytical linguistic approach comes across as the pure description of historical-epistemic conditions of possibility. It retains the scepticism expressed by Peter von Polenz in his concept of sentence semantic analysis
towards any kind of 'agentification' of abstractive epistemic or linguistic entities, whether these be concepts, key words or discourses.¹³

Conceptual history and linguistically founded discourse analysis unquestionably share the same historical-epistemic objectives. Both, I believe, are equally concerned with the analysis of systematic connections in historical semantics. Strictly speaking, no historical discourse analysis can get by without Koselleckian conceptual history. But it is prepared to go further, shifting emphases in particular a greater role to networking, to the necessity of certain conditions, and to the discursive mechanisms that exert a profound and long-term influence. To use a central concept of Foucault's, there is a greater emphasis on the conditions of possibility, the historical a priori of epistemes in their particular historical form. Thus there is no absolute opposition between conceptual history and the history of discourse in either theory or methodology. Rather, they can perhaps be understood as different perspectives on a common theme in view of their comparable objectives.

A historical-semantic discourse analysis can make use of approaches and methods from conceptual history, just as it makes use of other traditional methods. These may be methods from lexical semantics and textual semantics (for instance by using the fruitful and hitherto under-exploited concept of isotopy from structuralist semantics). They may be methods used in sentence semantics, including aspects relating to speech act theory or methods from cognitive semantics such as the analysis of frames of knowledge and semantic networks. Finally, approaches taken from Toulminian argument analysis, from topology, presupposition analysis or political symbol analysis may also be fruitfully applied in the method system employed by discourse analysis.

(4) Objectives and Methods of an Epistemologically Oriented Discourse Semantics

In the following I would like to briefly outline a few objectives and procedures that characterize historical-semantic discourse analysis as a contribution to an historical epistemology. The programme I have formulated of an historical discourse semantics¹⁴ borrows loosely from Foucault's discourse theory. Unlike a number of other advocates of discourse analysis, particular in Germany, I do not interpret this exclusively as ideology critique but as a descriptive project, similar to the way in which discourse analysis was applied to the methodology of linguistic analysis¹⁵ by Michel Pêcheux and others.¹⁶ The most important thing in our context is that Foucault regarded his discourse analysis as a genealogy, as the analysis of the genesis and conditions of social knowledge in discursive formations.

I consider the following elements of the Foucauldian concept of discourse¹⁷ useful for the purposes of an historical-semantic epistemology.

Foucault's discourse model is based on the concept of the énoncé, the statement. He defines discourse as a group of statements that belong to a single system of formation. It is important to him that statements not be equated with utterances (énonciations). Statements (as énoncés) are abstract entities that can appear in different linguistic forms and are not necessarily tied to a particular form of verbal expression. (From this point of view, Foucault's énoncé could be compared to the concept of proposition in logical sentence semantics, which is also used in modern cognitive linguistics.) However, if we want to avoid too strong and too problematic a proximity between the level of statements in the Foucauldian sense and, for instance, Plato's 'heaven of ideas' or Frege's 'third realm of thoughts', we should speak not of 'statements' but of 'segments of knowledge' that can be articulated in different verbal forms.

Accordingly, discourses are systems of formation consisting of segments of knowledge, which, Foucault stresses, govern the conditions of possibility of the production of certain utterances. Thus, for Foucault, discourses are an epistemically effective 'historical a priori' that governs the production, occurrence, formation of series, formation and force of statements. Foucault's definition of discourse in the 'Order of Discourse' as the space between thought and speech is now famous. In this space, it is above all the discursive mechanisms that are at work. These may function as mechanisms of exclusion, as mechanisms of production constraints on discursive events, as structuring mechanisms of epistemere, or as systems of knowledge formation.

Foucault names the four concepts event, series, regularity and condition of possibility as the basic terms of discourse analysis. The concept of event refers to the spontaneous and often unforeseeable occurrence of an epistemic element in an utterance, a text, etc. This epistemic element (énoncé in Foucault's terminology) does not have to be absolutely new (and in fact rarely is); its unforeseen occurrence in a new discursive
environment is enough to establish its character as an event. When such events occur more frequently, they form series and become the nuclei of discursive formations. New discursive structures are established when series of discursive events aggregate into regularities. Once established as systems of regularities, these discursive formations or structures act as conditions of possibility of the production of future, thematically related discursive events. They govern not only the actual occurrence but the very possibility of individual epistemic elements occurring in specific contexts. Foucault, then, also understands discourses as 'systems of dispersion' of statements. Thus discourse analysis examines discursive events in a field of knowledge, paying particular attention to the conditions of the occurrence of individual epistemic elements in given epistemic-discursive contexts. Discourses are shown to be regulated and discreet series of discursive events, the analyses of which is chiefly concerned with the identification of regularities. The analysis of these is, in Foucault's words, to ascertain 'how it is that a particular statement has appeared (at a given point) and no other in its place'.

Following Foucault, discourse analysis was developed into a methodological apparatus by the prematurely deceased Michel Pêcheux and his colleagues, among others. (A fruitful approach, particularly for language-related discourse-analytical objectives, that has found little resonance in Germany thus far.) In Pêcheux's words, discourses become 'readable sequences of signs (indices)', that form a corpus of socio-historical (one might add: epistemic) traces. The collective memory, the social episteme, is understood as a social body of traces that it is the job of discourse analysis to expose. Discourses are then able to be analysed as 'networks of signs, traces and trails'. A central characteristic of discourse analysis that Pêcheux particularly emphasizes is that it makes it possible to understand discursive relationships 'as the same thing that is repeated as such through all possible differences'. The inevitable conclusion, then, is that for the purposes of historical epistemology we should not be distracted by the superficial thematic and semantic level, that is, by the all too obvious textual structures of the underlying text corpora, from the differences in what appears to be the same and for what remains the same across all apparent distinctions. As Pêcheux's team demonstrated, the analysis of what appear to be counter-discourses (e.g. a 'right-wing' and a 'left-wing' discourse on a particular political subject) is particularly useful in identifying underlying discursive paradigms and similarities where a superficial, ideology-driven approach may not have suspected them.

My suggested exploitation of discourse analysis for the purposes of an historical-semantic epistemology was and is subject to some criticism. The most vehement is usually from the perspective of the guardians of a sacrosanct discourse analysis that is supposedly 'true' by virtue of its ideology critique. Its champions clearly take umbrage at the descriptive use of discourse analysis based on the Foucauldian model and the association of 'exalted' post-structuralist approaches with 'vulgar' linguistic analytical ones. They may feel vindicated by Foucault himself, who has left us a long list of negative definitions telling us what he believes discourse analysis should not be: it is not lexical history, not conceptual history, not semantics, not the history of ideas, not the history of mentalities, not epistemology in the traditional sense. Discourse analysis should be none of these, but should rather inhabit a space between and before these by deciphering historical a priori, the conditions of possibility and the genealogy of meanings, concepts, ideas, mentalities and epistemes. If, despite this, I lay claim to discourse analysis for an epistemologically oriented historical semantics, I appeal to Foucault himself, who once described his work in an interview as a box of tools to which anyone could help themselves.

In summary, I believe that the discourse analytical approach has the following advantages for an epistemologically oriented historical semantics: Any language-theoretic foundation of historical semantics which – as I have indicated – is to explain the processes of semantic change and of the constitution and the constancy or transmission of meaning, must also be able to explain how social knowledge influences the constitution and change of lexical and textual meanings. For the research objectives of historical semantics, it seems clear to me that the spectrum of semantically relevant knowledge must be widened, that a greater amount and broader scope of epistemic conditions of the textual constitution of meaning must be included in the analysis, than the narrow concept of meaning in traditional linguistic semantics would suggest. I am also speaking here of the field of semantically relevant or comprehension-related knowledge that has to be explained in a complete semantic analysis. This kind of 'rich' semantics or 'depth semantics' cannot limit itself to elucidating the 'obvious', as it were, epistemic elements of lexical and textual meanings. It must also explain the underlying, hidden knowledge that is normally overlooked because it is considered self-evident. This analysis also includes the elucidation of epistemic elements transported or insinuated in verbal utterances and of whose presence the speakers and recipients of the texts may not even be consciously aware. Any depth
semantics, be it conceived as lexical semantics, conceptual history, sentence semantics, textual analysis or discourse analysis, requires this knowledge pertaining to the constitution of meaning to be made explicit. If such a depth semantics is now to make a contribution – and this applies to all varieties of historical semantics – to an analysis of epistemic conditions, tendencies, and the formation systems of semantically relevant knowledge, it must consider it its duty to make explicit and to describe such presupposed knowledge in its influence on the linguistic constitution of meaning.

The concept of discourse is one potential instrument that can be useful in drawing attention to the kind of epistemic elements that are often all but ignored in traditional semantic analyses. Clearly, then, the concept of discourse initially serves to shift the focus and attention of historical semantics in a new and specific way. I believe it can draw attention to things that other historical semantic approaches (whether conceptual history, the history of mentalities, etc.) fail to notice. This alternative historical-semantic focus can help, for instance, to explain epistemic conditions that would have been overlooked from other perspectives. Thus the overly rigorous focus on abstract nouns (or key words – even if they are only taken as headings for epistemic complexes) can sometimes blind us to the presence of textual elements pertaining to the constitution of concepts in which the antecedent is omitted entirely. (I have endeavoured to demonstrate this with examples for the conception of nation.)

Moreover, a discourse-analytical perspective can be better suited to drawing attention to the formation systems and conditions of semantically relevant knowledge. I often refer here to Wittgenstein’s metaphor of the riverbed of thoughts. From a short-sighted, ahistorical point of view, the riverbed can easily be misconstrued as that which is absolutely immutable, fixed, given, whereas it can actually change, is historically constituted and hence contingent (Wittgenstein is thinking here of Western logic, for instance). Foucault speaks in this context of the historical a priori that has a genealogy but often appears to discourse-dependent individuals as that which is simply given and to be accepted. It is my firm belief that analysis of the knowledge that is unreflected, unarticulated, taken for granted and consequently not addressed, despite its capacity to structure discourse, must be central to any historical semantics aspiring to make a serious contribution to an historical epistemology.

Finally – and Foucault stressed this time and again – a discourse-analytical perspective directs our attention to different source material from traditional conceptual history. Rolf Reichardt spoke out particular strongly in favour of this aspect in his methodological suggestions on historical semantics. Suffice it to recall the dictum concerning ‘classic’ literature as the source base of some conceptual history analysis. This is contrasted from a discourse-analytical perspective with an expanded source base featuring a strong emphasis on everyday texts.

In the context of an epistemology proceeding along historical-semantic lines, discourse analysis need not entail a complete shift of focus to the micro-semantic level of corpus analysis. It requires rather a macro-semantic reorientation with regard to focus, selection of corpora and epistemic-semantic analysis. Its methodological value and its autonomy may consist chiefly in its formulation of a research strategy that is at once macro-semantic and depth-semantic. It does not stop where what is known anyway or tacitly considered self-evident is usually passed over and ignored as being irrelevant for semantic analysis. Rather, it begins precisely with the epistemic conditions of the linguistic constitution of meaning and focuses more heavily on the conditions that make the utterable and conceivable possible at all at a given point in time.

I once described historical semantics as a ‘regulated transformation of meaning for others into meaning for us’. A history of discourse is obviously equally entangled in the hermeneutic dilemma that it is only ever possible to explain those elements of the stocks of knowledge of past epochs and discourse formations that are thinkable and utterable against the backdrop of our own epistemes. The scepticism of historical semantics overall (and of semantics and textual analysis in general) with regard to methodology and the philosophy of science is therefore equally applicable to the discourse-historical approach. Even an inquiry made keener by the concept of discourse cannot prevent the fact that any selection of material, of cross-references, of key words, themes, figures of discourse and perspectives, will inevitably exclude other aspects. We cannot, therefore, expect of a discourse-analytical historical semantics and epistemology that it explain the entire network of epistemic references in which a text, a concept, an enoncé are embedded. Discord analysis simply means tracing certain specific strands of knowledge in all manner of texts, text-types, fields of articulation and discourse, that is, undertaking to focus thematically on series of individual enoncés, individual epistemic elements. And so discourse analysis must also make a selection, guided by thematic guidelines but based on the fundamental methodological idea of a ‘loosely-defined corpus that broadens during the research process.’ The purpose of discourse analysis can perhaps be aptly characterized by a citation from
Foucault: 'There is no knowledge without a particular discursive practice; and any discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it forms'.

(5) ‘The Self and the Other’ – Aspects of a Discourse-semantic Paradigm

Finally, I would like to suggest the direction discourse-historical analysis can take, using the discourse-semantic paradigm of 'the self and the other' as an example. I shall begin by outlining briefly what I mean by a discourse-semantic paradigm – something which can play a crucial role as the subject of a discourse-semantic analysis. One distinguishing feature of discourses is the recurrence of certain content elements in the texts attributable to them; another is that content elements aggregated into regularities are reflected in the texts that constitute (or contribute to) the corpus of individual discourses. This assumes that texts (and their components) are not original products formed ab ovo, as it were, by the intentionality of the producer – as an old preconception of language theory (and probably also everyday life) would have it. Rather, they use elements that are part of the epistemic-cognitive make-up of the text producers or have been picked up ad hoc by them from previous texts. The rhetorical tradition provides a number of expressions such as 'rhetorical devices', 'topoi', etc. for some of these phenomena. Rather than proposing a topic in this traditional sense (as has been called for recently, for instance in the field of legal argumentation), I prefer to speak heuristically of discourse-semantic paradigms. Topoi tend to be static, are generally viewed as constituting a thesaurus, and are located at the level of 'surface semantics'. By contrast, discourse-semantic paradigms tend to concern the 'depths' of textual semantics (which are often hidden and only communicated via additional analysis operations). They can also become apparent (to the eye and ear of the knowing observer) where the 'producers' and 'recipients' of the text in question have no knowledge yet of their existence. While they are not completely removed from the speaker's volition, they often reveal themselves involuntarily. In doing so they also reveal specific traits of the text producer or rather his or her thought. Discursive paradigms do sometimes rise to the surface of the discourse and become the explicit subject or theme of texts, and we could perhaps go so far as to suggest that this temporary explicitness is a necessary condition of their (initial?) occurrence and their structural efficacy. But their normal efficacy is generally such that their existence does explain the appearance of certain discursive elements, but these elements do not make it particularly apparent that the discursive paradigms are a part of the explicit textual meaning at the superficial level.

Discursive paradigms order textual elements, govern their occurrence at certain points in the discourse, and give the discourse an inner structure. This structure may not be identical to the thematic structure of the texts in which they appear. They form a pattern that can function in turn as the basic structure of interdiscursive epistemic connections. In this sense, discursive paradigms are not necessarily bound to a particular discourse or limited to one individual discourse, but can emerge in multiple discourses at the same time. In this way they contribute to interdiscursive relationships that perhaps correspond at the discourse level to what have been studied as intertextual relationships at the textual level in text linguistics. And so, discursive paradigms have a history that is not necessarily limited to the time period and occurrence of the actual reference discourse (of the analysis). On the contrary, the appeal of the discourse-analytical perspective stems precisely from the fact that some discursive tendencies and paradigms have an historical-epistemic dimension that was initially (and from the semantic perspective) quite unsuspected.

The concrete form that discursive paradigms take in a discourse is not of immediate importance.

1. They may appear as semantic features and form historical isotopic chains.
2. From an argument analysis perspective, they may be among the supporting elements of a text-based deduction rule.
3. They may be linguistic pragmatic presuppositions or parts of what is implied and has to be deduced by inference.
4. They may be hidden behind names or persons, things, circumstances or complexes of thoughts that are referred to.
5. And, finally, they may of course also be part of the superficial (lexical) meaning of words, concepts and texts in which they operate, whether noticed or unnoticed.

The standard methods of lexical semantics, concept analysis or textual analysis are often not sufficient to determine such discursive paradigms. For
instance, they do not necessarily have to be expressed in ‘abstract nouns’ (as per the old distinction made in semantic theory between autosemantic and synsemantic), but can also be contained in the textual semantic function of what are known as ‘function words’ (synsemantic). This is illustrated in the discourse-semantic paradigm ‘the self and the other’ with the personal pronouns we and they. These can be seen as codes for an elementary discursive figure and are clearly used in this function in many texts.

What I am looking at with the following text example cannot be addressed with the methods of lexical semantics or concept analysis nor with the traditional methods of sentence semantics or textual semantics. I am interested here in epistemic elements of an emerging discourse. These could perhaps best be apprehended using the methods of the analysis of frames of knowledge from more recent cognitive semantics or indeed with the viewpoint and approach of an historical-epistemological discourse analysis. The function and situating of the text example are exemplary in this respect. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the politicization of the collective self achieved a scope and a dynamic that grew in proportion with the de-individualizing tendencies of modern mass societies. Much has been said about these socio-historical connections and it is not my intention to address them again here. What we are concerned with in our discourse-analytical context is how the paradigm of self and other comes into play here and is defined and canonized in the nineteenth century in a manner so explicit as to be almost inconceivable from today’s historical point of view (following National Socialism and all it entailed).

My example illustrates the attempt to discursively establish a collective ego in such a way that this collective ego is to be founded on the discursive construct of a collective self, which is based in turn on an emotional, cultural-value-based dissociation from the other. What is key here is that this dissociation from the other, which is required for the formation of an identity as a collective ego, borrows conspicuously from the psycho-social make-up of the individual ego and the qualities it perceives in or attributes to itself. The discursive and psycho-social trajectory of this discourse paradigm could perhaps be described as follows: from the individual self to the collective self to the collective ego and on to the individual ego. (The individual ego is of course a collectivized individual ego, i.e. an ego that defines itself chiefly or exclusively via the qualities and attitudes of the collective ego.)

I would like to illustrate this with a text that is emblematic of the formation of a collective identity for nineteenth-century Germans, the novel ‘Debit and Credit’ by Gustav Freytag (published in 1855 and frequently reprinted in large numbers until the mid-twentieth century). This novel brings together every aspect of the specifically German national discourse in a quite remarkable manner. It could perhaps be described as the quintessential novel of Germanness. Alongside the central theme of the social and economic emancipation of the middle classes (though they never cherish any democratic ambitions), the novel also contains a good deal of subtly administered anti-Semitism and cultural chauvinism, mainly directed towards the East. The novel is therefore a typical liminal text, that is, the author has situated the plot in the archetypal and paradigmatic situation of the dissociation of the self from the other. The collective self becomes more clearly defined as it distances itself further from the collective other. The self (i.e. the formation of a collective identity) and the other (here, in the form of the neighbouring Polish nation) determine each other. They define themselves by carefully drawing a precise line between their respective characteristics (which the author portrays as archetypal).

The novel’s hero, Anton Wohlfahrt, explains to his cosmopolitan friend Fink why he, the merchant, intends to defend and preserve a nobleman’s estate in the Polish countryside under Prussian occupation from the attacks of a Polish freedom fighter. He is proud of the German character, of the superiority of German culture, which he cites as justification: ‘Culture, industry, and credit are on our side’, in other words, ‘German intelligence’. All of this gives him the right, he believes, ‘as one of the conquerors . . . in the behalf of free labor and civilization, [to usurp] the dominion of the country from a weaker race’. Everything Polish is portrayed negatively. The soil is ‘neglected’, the stable ‘miserable’ and the women ‘dirty’. The men failed to ‘inspire any confidence’, the cattle are ‘a poor set’, the buildings ‘cheerless’ and the living quarters ‘wretched’. By contrast, everything German is portrayed positively – and as typically German: the roof has been ‘mended’, a small garden dug, the child is blond and well-behaved, the woman neat and orderly, the man young and handsome, the room comfortable, coffee simmers on the stove, and of course there is a song-book and a rod, as symbols of German propriety and discipline. The passage ends with the exclamation: “This farm is the jewel of the estate,” cried Karl . . . “There are actually signs of a dunghill here . . . And there is a myrtle in the window. Hurra! here is a housewife! here is the fatherland! here are Germans!”

The passage culminates in the revealing cry of the (fictitious!) protagonist, “now we have come into being, and a new German nation has arisen.” We could replace the personal pronoun we with: ‘now the (collective) We has come into being . . . ’ In this novel, then, the author invests the collective
self with concrete features. An abstract rhetorical device becomes an idea with flesh and blood, which everyone who considers themselves a part of this collective. We can then identify. The particular impact of the novel's discursive trajectory lies, on the one hand, in the fact that specific content that characterizes (or is intended to characterize) the collective self as opposed to the collective other is presented (fictionally) in the form of oppositions to concrete, existing others. It also lies in the fact that epistemic-ideological elements of the establishment of a collective identity are conveyed in this way, and made available for other discursive applications, to the novel's recipients. This includes recipients of the text and of the models for collective identification contained therein (supplied by the author) who have no genuine individual experience of the (fictionally evoked, concrete 'other' and its (alleged) collective-other qualities.

What makes this nineteenth century text so unique is that it explicitly articulates what would generally be only implicitly conveyed (or presupposed) in modern texts. The paradigm of the self and the other is introduced into the narrative universe in a more or less definitional discursive act:

He who has always trodden life's macadamized ways, hedged in by law, moulded by order, custom, form, handed down from generation to generation habits a thousand years old, and who finds himself suddenly thrown among strangers, where law can but imperfectly protect him, and where he must assert by daily struggles his right to exist - such a one realizes for the first time the full blessing of the holy circle woven round each individual by his fellow-men, his family, his companions in labor, his race, his country. Whether he lose or gain in foreign parts, he must needs [sic] change. If he is a weakling, he will sacrifice his own manière d'être to the external influences around him; if he has the making of a man in him, he will become one now. The possessions, perhaps the prejudices, that he has grown up with, will wax dearer to him than ever; and much that once he looked upon as things of course, like air and sunshine, will become his most prized treasures. It is in foreign countries that we first enjoy the dialect of home, and in absence that we learn how dear to us is our fatherland.

The opposition between self and other is systematically established and extrapolated from the individual self to the collective self. Expressions such as Heimat in the original German (which conveys the idea of home or homeland), holy circle, and fellow-men function as links between the individual and the collective ego. This transition is systematically developed in the archetypal sequence individual-family-companions in labor-race-country. The individual's perception of him or herself is redefined collectively in expressions such as his own manière d'être. And, finally, the closing sentence expresses particularly well how the individually felt self has to become an abstract identification of the individual with his or her collective ego, presented here as fatherland but actually - and this is typically German - meaning country. The self is identified with the familiar and comforting dialect of home that envelops one in one's everyday life in a cocoon of self-related aspects of life and of one's own psycho-social situation. This allows it to function as a symbol for the collective self, which is presented here - ideologized and politicized as fatherland - as a greater, more all-embracing self, in which the individual can feel just as safe and secure as in his or her immediate experience of everyday life in the bosom of the family.

The quotations from the novel cited here reveal a way in which the discursive paradigm of the self and the other functions that is typical of the nineteenth century and indeed perhaps also illustrates a basic characteristic of how this paradigm operates. I am referring to the fact that the discursively founded collective identity (and hence the collective self as the actual content of a collective self-image) represents a negative image of the discursively postulated attributes of the collective other. This means that the collective self is the converse (negative) identity of the collective other. In this sense, the collective self is precisely what the discursively postulated collective other is not, or, to turn it around: it is (allegedly) not that which allegedly particularly distinguishes the collective other. Thus the self is only defined through the aid of the other, without which it would not only not be as it is but would arguably not be at all.

(6) Options, Opportunities and Limitations of Discourse-semantic Research

The historical discourse semantics I propose is situated (as is conceptual-history-related historical semantics) within the spectrum of historical epistemology. It is both descriptive and analytical in approach, without excluding outright the critical examination of discursive structures. Description and analysis are not, however, disparaged as the mere positivistic duplication of data (as some would evidently have it). Rather, semantic discourse analysis is founded on the belief that description and
analysis are intrinsically linked in epistemological contexts, and that
the convincing description of discursive structures and trajectories is in
fact what makes it possible, in the network of epistemes, to explore their
connections and how certain basic patterns operate. Only then can the latter
be deciphered as patterns that may be related to and induced by power.
From the descriptive and analytical standpoint of a discourse-semantic
epistemology, any hasty criticism of discursive conditions is treading on
precarious ground. It is a criticism of the very basis of our own thought and
knowledge. This kind of criticism, which begins at the foundations, could
initially be philosophical in nature rather than politically motivated. Even
if post-Foucauldian discourse analysis cannot deny its origins in ideology
critique,35 an analytical description of the verbal knowledge and thought of
a particular time or trend as materialized in texts cannot claim to be the final
arbiter of epistemes. To do this, it would have to assume an Archimedean
point outside the epistemes, the possibility of which has been rejected by
every serious philosophical reflection since time began.36 We must adhere
strictly to the pre-eminence of meticulous description and analysis in the
epistemological context. One reason for this is that no adequate description
of depth-semantic epistemic conditioning can be satisfactorily realized
from within the discourse, the epistemes of a particular time.37 Moreover,
any rash critique (of power) that disregards the limits of what it is possible
to say and think at a particular time overlooks a key element of discourse
analysis, namely the identification of the historical a priori. Any other form
of examining epistemological-discursive conditions which presents itself
as analysis, would, should it fail to observe these priorities, immediately be
suspected of doing precisely what it criticizes: implementing a transparently
interest-driven (and hence no longer descriptive) interpretation of the
epistemic circumstances, an interpretation it would not hesitate to identify
as a 'context of delusion' (in plain English: 'ideology') in its objects of study.

Despite its strictly descriptive and analytical approach, historical-
epistemological discourse semantics must by no means ignore the
fundamental dependence on interests and standpoint inherent in any
study of cultural phenomena. If it professes a commitment to the 'happy
positivism' exemplified by Foucault, it does so on the basis of a self-
assessment of its own cognitive possibilities. This should by no means
deny the validity of the epistemo-critical position of the hermeneutics of
someone like Schleiermacher, for instance. Any historiography is concerned
first and foremost with texts, and historical semantics all the more so. It
would, therefore, be pious self-deception to deny its methodological and
epistemological affinity with hermeneutics (in the advanced philosophical
sense). While historical discourse semantics may not on any account be
equated with hermeneutics (Foucault has convincingly expounded the
problematic nature of the hermeneutic search for the 'true', 'hidden',
'latent' meaning), it does share its methodological problems and hence its self-
reflection. This reflection upon its own possibilities also contains the seeds
of its self-limitation. It would be denying its discourse-critical roots, were
its primary objective the (re-)construction of a 'true' discourse 'behind' the
manifest texts. Rather, it draws pictures, describes scenarios, creates maps
of the epistemic landscape of a discursive network. In doing so it devotes
as much attention to the dynamic aspect as it does to description of the
structures, and it is perhaps this very process orientation that distinguishes
it from earlier hermeneutics. Above all, however, it is not so presumptuous
as to sideline the epistemes in their discursive structures and trajectories
with the methods of the discipline, through description, analysis, and
possibly also criticism. It examines, rather, the epistemic landscape (and
hence the historical semantics) of a particular time or society as a social
conditio humana, an historical a priori, that provides the foundation and
raison d'ètre for its own activity in particular. To put it conservatively, it
does no more than what Foucault himself describes with great foresight in
the 'Order of Discourse' (we need only replace the word 'commentary' with
'discourse analysis'):

Mais, d'autre part, le commentaire n'a pour rôle, quelles que soient les techniques
mises en œuvre, que de dire enfin ce qui était articulé silencieusement là-bas.
Il doit, selon un paradoxe qu'il déplace toujours mais auquel il n'échappe jamais,
dire pour la première fois ce qui cependant avait été déjà dit et répété
inlassablement qui pourtant n'avait jamais été dit. Le mouvement
inédié des commentaires est travaillé de l'intérieur par la rêve d'une répétition
masquée: à son horizon, il n'y a peut-être rien d'autre que ce qui était à son
point de départ, la simple récitation.38

(Translation: Joy Titheridge)

Notes

1 [Note: the word 'concept' is used in this article in both its abstract
meaning, i.e. a conception or notion, and in the sense of conceptual
history, i.e. relating to specific terms. In German, this is reflected by the
dichotomy of Begriff, as in Begriffsgeschichte (conceptual history), and Konzept (an abstract concept).]


3. An apprehension that was not entirely groundless, judging by a methodological analysis of a number of articles of Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhard Koselleck (eds), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, 8 vols in 9 (Stuttgart: Klett, 1972–1997).

4. A 'richer' semantics was in fact proposed as early as 1934 in Karl Bühler, Sprachtheorie (Jena: G. Fischer, 1934; repr. Stuttgart: G. Fischer, 1999), and excellently formulated by the Germanist Peter von Polenz in his Deutsche Satzsemantik: Grundbegriffe des Zwischen-den Zeilen-Lese (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1985).


6. [Note: Wittgenstein II refers to the second major part of Ludwig Wittgenstein's works, the Philosophical Investigations, which formulates a complex philosophical theory with which language in use, or everyday language, can be analysed. The first and much earlier major work of Wittgenstein is the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, concerned primarily with logic and structural linguistics. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (eds), Philosophical Investigations (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).]

7. Individual reflections on this issue can be found in Busse (1987). However, I am well aware today that the realization of my original ideas would have required nothing more nor less than the formulation of my own sociology of knowledge, something which was simply not feasible for a linguist (let alone within a reasonable time frame).

8. I have been reproached by highly committed advocates of a discourse analysis of power relations for this very association of action theory concepts with concepts from Foucauldian discourse analysis. Quite apart from the fact that any reduction of Foucault's intentions to the criticism and destruction of power overlooks the enormous descriptive potential and theoretical groundwork of his discourse theory (Michel Foucault, Larchéologie du savoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 164: 'Je suis un positivist de l'histoire的衣服, in response to Sylvie Lebon, 'Un positiviste désespéré, Les temps modernes, 248 (1967), 1299–1319), which is as valid a source as his critique of power, this accusation fails to appreciate the theoretical groundwork laid by a pragmatic theory of language. This can by no means be reduced to a superficial linguistic intentionalism nor does it automatically exclude the consideration of the epistemic predispositions favoured by more recent post-structuralist approaches. (Cf. Dietrich Busse, 'Konventionalisierungsstufen des Zeichengebrauchs als Ausgangspunkt semantischen Wandels. Zum Entstehen lexicaler Bedeutungen und zum Begriff der Konvention in der Bedeutungstheorie von H. P. Grice', in idem (ed.), Diachrone Semantik und Pragmatik. Untersuchungen zur Erklärung und Beschreibung des Sprachwandels (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1991), 37–65.)

9. For which I am grateful to my university teacher Rainer Wimmer.

10. They are discussed in greater detail in Busse (1987).


12. I describe this as an 'intermediate phase' because prior to the rise of structuralism, the older, traditional linguistic semantics had no part in the subsequent semantic reductionism. There is ample evidence, particularly in history from the period preceding the reception of Saussure's 'Cours' (i.e. before 1920) of an interest in semantics that was motivated by an interest in cultural phenomena. This can certainly be read as a prelude to a semantic epistemology or 'depth semantics'. In this regard and in the context of the history of research, more recent approaches in semantics (more recent, that is, at least for linguistics) which focus on cultural phenomena (whether as conceptual history, discourse analysis, the history of mentalities, etc.) are simply picking up on a thread that had been interrupted by the technologically motivated, formalistic concept of what is known as 'modern' linguistics. On earlier historical semantics, cf. the outline in Dietrich Busse, 'Sémantischer Wandel in traditioneller Sicht. (Etymologie und Wortgeschichte III)', in David A. Cruse and al. (eds), Lexikologie. Ein internationales Handbuch zur Natur und Struktur von Wörtern und Wortgeschichten (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002), 1306–24.


Incidentally, many propositions on the theoretical foundations of historical semantics, which is what I am interested in, could have been formulated purely with reference to Wittgenstein. (I have been vigorously reproached for precisely this association of Foucault's discourse theory with Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and other approaches from linguistic analytical philosophy. The detractors were supporters of a discourse research with a clear emphasis on ideology critique – and also, mind you, scorers of analytical thought. This is actually a fairly platitudinous academic version of a structure of prejudice that enjoys great popularity among German intellectuals and is based on the implicit concept of a strictly antonymic relationship between Anglophilia and Francophilia.) However, I believe that Foucault's concept of discourse provided and continues to provide analytical possibilities and perspectives that would have first had to have been constructed on the basis of the fragmentary Wittgensteinian approach that has more to do with fundamental philosophical questions. Foucault's approach is much closer to the phenomena, the material, the social and historical analysis of an historical epistemology, and hence allows more direct connections to be made in this regard.


[Note: quoted freely after Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London/New York: Routledge, 2002), 30: 'how it is that one particular statement appeared rather than another'.]

Pêcheux (1983), 54.

These detractors are clearly unaware of the descriptive approach also taken by Pêcheux and others and ignorant of the descriptive content of Foucault's theory itself. Unlike their Cisrhenian disciples, the former certainly did combine description and critique in their analysis (quite in keeping with their secret role model Marx, who knew all along that penetrating and clear-sighted analysis and description of the prevailing conditions are the prerequisites for any germane critique of these conditions and thus for their subversion).


Busse (1987), 301.


Foucault (1969), 238.


I am extremely grateful to Fritz Hermann for pointing out (many years ago) the wealth of information this text conveys about the history of discourse and of mentalities. [Note: the English edition quoted in the following is Gustav Freytag, *Debit and Credit: a Novel*, trans. L. C. Cummings (New York: Harper, 1858).]

Freytag (1858), 317. [Note: "Dies Vorwerk ist ein Juwel Gottes", rief Karl... "Hier sind deutliche Spuren einer Dämonstätte... Und hier steht ein Myrtenstock am Fenster. Hurra! hier ist eine Hausfrau, hier ist Vaterland, hier sind Deutsche."]

Ibid., 401.

Ibid., 313–14. [Note: 'Wer immer in den gebahnten Wegen des Lebens fortgegangen ist, begrenzt durch das Gesetz, bestimmt durch Ordnung, Sitte und Form, welche in seiner Heimat als tausendjährige Gewohnheit von Geschlecht zu Geschlecht vererbt sind, und wer plötzlich als einzelner unter Fremde geworfen wird, wo das Gesetz sein Rechte nur unvollkommen zu
schützen vermöge, und wo er durch eigene Kraft die Berechtigung zu leben sich alle Tage erkämpfen muß, der erst erkennt den Segen der heiligen Kreise, welche um jeden einzelnen Menschen Tausende der mitlebenden bilden, die Familie, seine Arbeitsgenossen, sein Volksstamm, sein Staat. Ob er in der Fremde verliere oder gewinne, er wird ein anderer. Ist er ein Schwächling, so wird er die eigene Art den fremden Gewalten opfern, in deren Bannkreis er getreten ist. Hat er Stoff zu einem Manne, jetzt wird er einer. Doppelt teuer werden seiner Seele die Güter, in deren Besitz er aufgewachsen war, vielleicht auch die Vorurteile, die an seinem Leben hingen; und manches, was er sonst gleichgültig angesehen hatte wie Luft und Sonnenscheine, das wird jetzt sein höchste Gut. Erst im Auslande lernt man den Reiz des Heimatlidetekes genießen, erst in der Fremde erkennt man, was das Vaterland ist.


36 Cf. in our context Michel Foucault, 'La pensée du dehors', *Critique*, 229 (1966), 523–46.

37 However, this does not mean that we should automatically take as our sole benchmark Foucault's suggestion of one hundred years as the minimum distance between researcher and object.

38 'But on the other hand the commentary's only role, whatever the techniques used, is to say at last what was silently articulated "beyond", in the text. By a paradox which it always displaces but never escapes, the commentary must say for the first time what had, nonetheless, already been said, and must tirelessly repeat what had, however, never been said. The infinite rippling of commentaries is worked from the inside by the dream of a repetition in disguise: at its horizon there is perhaps nothing but what was at its point of departure – mere recitation.' Foucault (1971), 27. [Note: English translation: Michel Foucault, 'The Order of Discourse', trans. Ian McLeod in Robert Young (ed.), *Unfiting the Text: A Poststructuralist Reader* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981) 57–8.]